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Abstract 
This paper explores the impact of antiquity on capitalism through the finance-growth nexus. 
We define antiquity as the length of established statehood (i.e., state history) and agricultural 
years. We argue that extractive institutions and deeply entrenched interest groups may 
prevail in societies with ancient roots. The paper offers an in-depth analysis of one particular 
channel through which extractive institutions may impair economic growth: the finance-
growth channel. We propose that in countries with ancient statehood, the financial sector 
might be captured by powerful economic and political elites leading to a distorted finance-
growth relationship. We build a model in which the equilibrium relationship between 
companies and banks depends on the entrenchment of the economic elites and the length of 
established statehood. To validate our argument empirically, we run panel-threshold 
regressions on a global sample between 1970 and 2014. The regression results are supportive 
and show that financial development – measured by the outstanding amount of credit – is 
negative for growth in states with ancient institutional origins, while it is positive in relatively 
younger ones.  
Keywords: antiquity, finance-growth nexus, interest groups, rent-seeking 




This paper explores the impact of state antiquity on capitalism through the finance-growth 
nexus. We define antiquity as the length of established statehood within the present-day 
territory of a country. In the tradition of the deep-roots of economic development (henceforth 
DRD) literature, we conjecture that historical legacies are important in understanding the 
contemporary differences in socio-economic outcomes (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013). 
However, in contrast to a large part of this literature, we focus on how capitalism functions 
rather than on what long-run results it brings about in terms of economic development under 
state antiquity. The two approaches are intimately connected: the former enables a deeper 
understanding of the latter.  
The paper takes into account the result of Borcan et al. (2018) according to which a much 
too long history of statehood might be detrimental to economic development because of the 
probable emergence of extractive institutions and deeper entrenchment of interest groups in the 
society. Our main contribution to the literature is that we elaborate a particular channel 
proposed in the seminal paper of Dombi and Grigoriadis (2020), the finance-growth nexus, 
through which extractive institutions may manifest themselves in societies with ancient roots. 
We present convincing evidence that in countries with a long-established statehood, the 
financial sector tends to allocate society’s savings in an inefficient way because of its likely 
capture by the economic and political elites. The impaired functioning of the financial sector is 
a devastating example of the heavy legacy of antiquity on capitalism. The paper is motivated 
by the finance-growth literature, the corruption in lending literature and two sub-strands of the 
DRD literature: the state history and the historical development literature.  
The empirical finance-growth literature dates back to the early 1990s (King and Levine, 
1993). In its first wave, the general conclusion was that financial development was beneficial 
for growth (Levine, 2005). However, from the early 2000s a growing number of papers have 
challenged the linearity proposed in previous studies (Rosseau and Wachtel, 2002; Deidda and 
Fattouh, 2002). This second generation of the finance-growth literature has switched the focus 
to the nonlinear effect of financial development on growth. A group of papers suggests that the 
effect of financial development on growth may depend on the level of economic development 
in a positive way (e.g., Rioja and Valev, 2004). Their argument is that higher development is 
paired with better institutions and the Schumpeterian role of banks in selecting promising 
investments might be more important in the intensive phase of economic development than in 
the extensive one. A second source of nonlinearity relates to the size of the financial sector by 
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assuming that too much finance is bad for growth. Indeed, the inverted U-shaped relationship 
of financial development with growth is well established (e.g., Law and Singh, 2014; Arcand 
et al., 2015). The third strand of the nonlinear finance-growth literature emphasizes the role of 
institutions and argues that better institutions result in better finance (e.g., Law et al., 2013; Law 
et.al, 2018). Finally, Dombi and Grigoriadis (2020) initiate a new channel of nonlinear finance 
by demonstrating that longer state history over the last two millennia is paired with a less 
beneficial growth effect of financial development in post-socialist transition economies.  
The literature on corruption in lending investigates the mechanisms and conditions of the 
capture of the financial sector and surveillance authorities by interest groups. Its main insight 
is that if this capture occurs the allocation of savings becomes suboptimal, resulting in slower 
growth. In their seminal paper, Beck et al. (2006) study how bank supervisory policies are 
connected to corruption in lending. According to their results, powerful centralized bank 
supervision tends to increase corruption in lending. They conjecture the state/regulatory capture 
of the banking sector in the latter case. In contrast to Beck et al. (ibid.), Barth et al. (2009) focus 
on the effect of competition and information sharing among lenders on corruption in lending. 
They find that the more concentrated the banking sector is, the more widespread corruption in 
lending is. They argue that a low level of banking sector competition enhances the bargaining 
power of banks against firms and makes the latter resort to bribery. Barry et al. (2016) considers 
how banks’ ownership structure influences corruption in lending. According to their empirical 
results, family and state ownership tends to increase lending corruption in both developed and 
developing countries. The authors explain this outcome with the importance of relatedness in 
bank lending. Morck et al. (2011) also corroborate the tendency toward the elite-capture of a 
country’s financial system when banks are controlled by tycoons. According to their results, in 
the case of the latter , not only is capital allocation less efficient, but financial instability is also 
more prevalent.      
The state history literature was initiated by the seminal paper of Bockstette et al. (2002). 
These authors construct the state history index of the last two millennia, measuring the length 
of established statehood in the present-day territories of countries. Based on this index, they 
conclude that state history is positively associated with economic development. Bockstette et 
al. (ibid.) argue that countries with a longer state history tend to have better institutions and 
state capacity. Furthermore, Ang (2013) demonstrates that early starter countries are also 
financially more developed, at least according to the experience of the last two millennia. 
Borcan et.al. (2018) extend the original state history index over the last six millennia. They find 
that if the ages before the Common Era are also taken into account, and ancient societies (e.g., 
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Egypt, Greece) can really be differentiated from younger ones, the relationship of state history 
with contemporary economic development follows an inverted U-shape. They continue to 
recognize the positive effect of established statehood proposed by Bockstette et al. (2002), but 
argue that with a longer state history, societies tend to have more centralized institutions and 
more powerful interest groups, resulting in more pervasive rent-seeking. In the state history-
economic development nexus, this implies a tipping point above which the negative 
consequences of longer state history outweigh the positive ones, leading to a lower level of 
economic development. Indeed, there is some evidence that older societies tend to have more 
centralized and autocratic political and social systems. Hariri (2012) finds that countries with a 
longer state history in the pre-Columbian era were more effective in being able to resist 
European colonization and settlements and preserve their own regime, resulting in more 
autocratic establishments today. Hariri also demonstrates that older societies pursue more 
collectivist values. Lagerlöf (2016) suggests that countries with an early statehood have become 
stuck in autocracy because of the higher extractive capacities of the incumbent rulers and thus 
their lower willingness to bestow power in the form of a democratic transition.  
The literature on historical development aims to reveal the persistent effect of historical 
events on present socio-economic outcomes and the underlying transmission channels, mainly 
focusing on culture and formal institutions (Nunn, 2014).1 Nunn (2008) finds that the number 
of slaves exported from a country in Africa negatively affects its current level of economic 
development. He argues that slave trade reduced interpersonal trust, thereby impeding both the 
establishment of strong states and the emergence of ethnically homogenous large communities. 
Lowes et al. (2017) examine the impact of historical institutions on contemporary cultural 
norms. They take the example of the Kuba Kingdom, established in Central Africa in the 17th 
century with one of the most developed centralized statehoods of that time in the region. They 
conclude that those individuals whose ancestors lived in the Kuba Kingdom are more likely to 
be associated with weaker forms of rule following and are more prone to cheating for material 
gain than those whose ancestors lived outside the Kingdom. The authors argue that this might 
be the legacy of more developed formal institutions that enabled Kuba citizens to place less 
importance on the intergenerational transmission of the right norms and values. Guiso et al. 
(2016) also emphasize the importance of cultural persistence in establishing a link between 
historical shocks and contemporary socio-economic outcomes. They find that Italian cities 
which achieved self-governance in the Middle Ages have a higher level of civic capital today. 
                                                          
1 This literature has been exploding recently, with a massively growing number of papers. For a thorough review 
see Nunn (2014). 
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Gusio et al. (ibid.) argue that this might be the result of the conducive attitudes (such as self-
efficacy beliefs) that emerged in independent Medieval cities being transmitted across 
generations. Becker et al. (2016) take the Habsburg rule as a positive historical shock in terms 
of public sector quality. They find that corruption in courts and police is significantly lower, 
while public trust in these institutions is significantly higher, in those regions of the successor 
state that were previously under Habsburg rule than in those that were not. The authors argue 
that this can be attributed to the long-run cultural effect of highly developed centralized 
institutions in the former Habsburg Empire. The long-run cultural legacy of empires is also 
corroborated in the case of Poland by Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya (2015).  
The main hypothesis of the paper builds on the following conclusions of the literature 
considered: 1. antiquity (i.e. the remote past) still shapes our present, 2. an extensive history of 
statehood tends to result in deeply entrenched interest groups, 3. powerful economic and 
political elites are prone to capture the financial sector, and 4. the effect of financial 
development on economic growth is conditional. The intuitive theoretical framework building 
on the seminal results of Dombi and Grigoriadis (2020) is presented in Figure 1. We start off 
with the hypothesis of Borcan et al. (2018), according to which interest groups are more deeply 
entrenched in societies with a long-established statehood. As a result, rent-seeking and 
extractive institutions are more prevalent. One important way of extracting rents is the access 
to easy credits provided under generous conditions. This permanent striving for corrupt lending 
leads companies to capture the financial sector through their political and private connections 
– provided that they have the power needed. Corruption in lending results in the inefficient 
allocation of society’s savings and an impaired finance-growth relationship. Figure 1 depicts 
the sequence of our arguments. 
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The Borcan-Olsson-Putterman (2018) hypothesis 
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We follow a two-step strategy to provide evidence supporting our arguments. First, we 
develop a theoretical model on the interaction of banks and enterprises to show how antiquity 
may impair the finance-growth nexus by supporting soft-budget constraints in lending. In this 
model, there are two equilibrium regimes: younger countries with an economic elite too weak 
to corrupt banks in their lending activity and older countries with an economic elite strong 
enough to capture the financial sector. In the second step, we examine empirically whether 
financial development, measured by the amount of credit, is less favorable in more ancient 
societies. The regression results are supportive, indicating that the finance-growth nexus is 
indeed impaired in countries with a long statehood. 
Our paper builds on Dombi and Grigoriadis (2020) and extends their results in several 
respects. First, we follow a general approach by focusing on antiquity. Whilst Dombi and 
Grigoriadis (ibid.) use the state history index of the last two millennia constructed by Bockstette 
et al. (2002), we resort to the extended index of Borcan et al. (2018) also including the ancient 
ages before the Common Era. Moreover, as an alternative measure of antiquity, the number of 
agricultural years since the Neolithic Revolution is also considered in our analysis (see below). 
The second improvement is that our paper provides a profound theoretical foundation for the 
impaired financed-growth nexus in societies with ancient roots. Finally, our empirical results 
embrace the last half-century and the whole globe. With these improvements, our paper 
contributes to the thorough establishment of the legacy perspective – proposed by Dombi and 
Grigoriadis (2020) – in the nonlinear finance-growth literature. 
Our paper also contributes to the other strands of the literature discussed previously. First, 
instead of focusing on the contemporary structural characteristics of the financial sector, we 
augment the literature on corruption in lending by revealing the deep historical root of the 
underlying phenomenon. Second, our paper also contributes to the DRD literature by 
elaborating the finance-growth channel in terms of the suboptimal work of capitalism under the 
conditions of antiquity.   
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the tales of two countries with ancient 
statehood and analyzes the capture of the financial sector by powerful elites. Section 3 discusses 
the theoretical model, while Section 4 introduces the measures of state antiquity. Section 5 
presents the data and the empirical methodology and Section 6 the results, with  Section 7 
offering a general discussion of the results. Section 8 performs the sensitivity analyses and 
Section 9 concludes.   
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2. The tales of two countries 
We start with the experiences of two ancient and, at the same time, developed countries, Italy 
and South Korea. The two countries have very different cultural and institutional backgrounds, 
but one point is common: their banking sectors have frequently suffered from the collusion of 
political and economic elites, both in times of massive state centralization and liberalized 
financial markets. 
Italy 
After the Italian Banking Act of 1936, the government gained considerable control over banks 
in Italy and strongly influenced credit allocation (Rota, 2013). During the Golden Age (1950-
1970), the banking system heavily promoted domestic capital accumulation by providing 
preferential credits for state-owned enterprises, in close accordance with the industrialization 
strategy of the government. Although this policy was conducive for growth until the 1970s, the 
negative side effects of inefficient resource allocation started to proliferate in the ensuing two 
decades (Del Monte and Papagni, 2007). During the half-century of state centralization the 
collusion between politicians and industrialists intensified significantly and political 
connections became an invaluable currency for access to bank credits.2 
Even after the financial deregulation and nationwide investigation into political corruption 
in the 1990s, banks continued to be exposed to considerable political influence (Stefancic, 
2017). Italy also has a higher ratio of politically connected firms than most other countries 
(Faccio 2006). Infante and Piazza (2014) find that these firms enjoy loans with lower interest 
rates than the market average and the preferential treatment is stronger when firms and banks 
are linked with the same politician. Carretta et al. (2012) focus on politicians on the boards of 
directors of banks and come to the conclusion that their presence exerts a negative effect on 
                                                          
2 There are several documented instances of elite collusion and corruption in lending. We cite three notable cases. 
The first case is the financial scandal involving Milan’s Banco Ambeosiano which collapsed in 1982 after 
unsecured loans were endorsed by the Vatican. As early as 1978, the bank was being investigated by the Bank of 
Italy. However, the investigation countered heavy political opposition (Lewis, P.: “Italy's Mysterious, Deepening 
Bank Scandal”. The New York Times, 28. July 1982). The second case is the spectacular and rapid rise of Silvio 
Berlusconi’s financial empire, the Fininvest, owing to some extent to the advocacy of Bettino Craxi, socialist party 
leader and later prime minister (Semler, P.K.: “Italy's Corrupt Industrial Elite”. The Journal of Commerce, 15. 
November 1993). The third case is the bumpy escape of Corriere della Sera, the foremost newspaper in Italy. The 
company fell into financial trouble in 1977, but was unable to obtain bank credit because of the editor’s opposition 
to the ruling party. Finally, the newspaper managed to acquire financial support from P2 (Masonic Lodge) by 
serving its political interests. (Gumbel, A.: “Obituary: Franco Di Bella”. Independent, 23. December 1997). 
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loan quality. Even in banks where politicians have no position, the appointment of CEOs and 
members of the board of directors have frequently been constrained by political power (Rota, 
2013).  To sum up, there is ample evidence that there is great interference in the governance of 
Italian banks by political interests. Biased developmental banking has certainly contributed to 
the weak efficiency of Italian banks and, thereby, the significant share of non-performing loans 
(Angelini et.al, 2017; Stefancic, 2017).3  
South Korea (Korea hereafter) 
The financial sector in Korea also experienced massive state intervention, but suffered more 
from the collusive elite networks. A highly institutionalized system of kickbacks was first set 
up under the Park regime (1963-1979). The regime nationalized the banking sector and, as a 
major tool of industrial policy, exerted a tight control on credit allocation. This allowed the 
evolvement of a quasi-institutionalized system of bribery: senior party officials collected fixed 
payments from business conglomerates (chaebol) and provided access to bank credit 
(Hellmann, 2017). In 1974, there were 50 chaebols enjoying preferential access to both foreign 
and domestic loans thanks to governmental backing (Kyong-Dong, 1976). The corruption in 
lending continued to prevail under the Chun regime (1980-1988) (Schopf, 2011).4 Surprisingly, 
the rise of democracy in the late 1980s did not dismantle the collusive elite network (Wad, 
2002)5. Indeed, Park (2008) finds that the number of collusive networks multiplied after the 
introduction of free elections, and chaebols continued providing financial support to politicians 
and probable political candidates.6  
                                                          
3 In 2016, non-performing loans in Italian banks amounted to roughly 22 percent of GDP. Recent examples of easy 
lending are the preferential credits to two highly indebted companies, Stefanel (the third largest clothing 
manufacturer in Italy) and the Feltrinelli publishing group (the Italian publishing giant) (Stefancic, 2017). These 
companies were facing severe financial problems, even bankruptcy, when applying for bank credit. Although there 
is no direct evidence of political inference, lending to such financially stressed companies under extraordinarily 
favorable conditions seems to be indicative in our respect. 
4 Schopf (2011) reveals that Chun Doo-hwan’s regime allocated private property and loans at no cost to firms 
which paid the largest bribe and were connected with members of his ruling elite, allowing him to amass at least 
1.24 billion USD from the corporate sector illegally. 
5 The government retained control over privatized banks, resulting in a higher ratio of bad loans than in the case 
of originally privately-owned banks without any state-ownership in the past (An et.al, 2007). 
6 One of the most salient scandals concerns the Hanbo Steel corporation, which went bankrupt in 1997 after 
accumulating a large number of preferential credits by bribing ruling party officials (Nakarmi, L.: “The fall of 
Hanbo Steel”. Asiaweek CNN, 7. February 1997). The scandal touched the inner-circle of the president too. 
(“Officials close to Kim charged in South Korea loan scandal” CNN, 11. February 1997) 
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Owing to elite collusion, the chaebols’ economic and political power grew continuously and 
the financial sector became even more captured after democratization, leading to increasingly 
clientelistic and biased financial policies (Lukauskas, 2002; Kalinowski and Cho, 2009). The 
chaebols’ leverage on the financial sector evolved as follows. In the 1970s, the control over 
credit policy was already practiced by the chaebols and the government in a mixed way (Choi, 
1993; Woo, 1991). In the late 1980s, the deregulation of interest rates became bogged down 
due to the opposition of chaebols who feared the growing interest burden and loss of their 
preferential access to credit (Choi, 1993). In the 1990s, however, much progress was achieved 
in financial deregulation because the chaebols faced fewer constraints to ownership of non-
bank financial institutions and thus freer access to credit (Lee, 2005). In the 2000s, the 
government aimed to weaken the chaebols’ power by admitting foreign investors to the 
financial sector. However, the endeavor failed due to the sluggish stabilization and restructuring 
of the financial industry (Kalinowski and Hyekyung, 2009). In recent years, the scandal of 
Samsung, the largest conglomerate in Korea, has revealed that the collusive elite network still 
might play a crucial role in the financial sector.7 
The experiences of these two countries illustrate the point that financial development in 
societies with ancient statehood may suffer from state intervention and collusive intra-elite 
relationships. As a counter-example, we may consider briefly the case of Canada, a relatively 
young state. In Canada, the banking sector faces only minor state and political interventions 
and is more or less politically independent (Breydo, 2015). Although the banking market is 
highly concentrated, there are no symptoms of elite collusion in terms of lending (Calomiris 
and Haber, 2014; Breydo, 2015) and firms face no significant obstacles in access to credit (Beck 
et.al, 2004; Hendry and King, 2004). Competition among banks is intensive (Shaffer, 1993; 
Allen and Engert, 2007), which can be effective in curbing corruption in lending (Barth et.al, 
2007). Indeed, based on the investigation of Beck et.al (2006), the level of banking corruption 
in Canada is one of the lowest worldwide. The possible reasons for the contrast between Korea 
and Italy, on the one hand, and Canada, on the other hand, may be manifold. We conjecture that 
antiquity and its social legacy might play a crucial role in this respect.   
                                                          
7 “Samsung scandal: Who is Lee Jae-yong?” (www.bbc.com, 5. February 2018) 
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3. Measures of antiquity 
In this paper, antiquity of societies is defined as the length of established statehood beyond the 
tribal level in the present-day territory of countries. Mature statehood is a necessary – and most 
of the time also a sufficient – condition for the settlement of socio-political frameworks and 
hierarchical power structures. We resort to two commonly used measures of established 
statehood: the state history index, first introduced by Bockstette et al. (2002) and extended by 
Borcan et al. (2018), and the agricultural years since the Neolithic revolution collected by 
Putterman and Trainor (2018). 
Our baseline measure of antiquity is the extended state history index of Borcan et al. (2018), 
which embraces the last six millennia (3500 BCE - 2000 AD).8 This state history index 
measures the cumulative experience of societies with established statehood in the underlying 
period. It is computed on the basis of the state history scores of the constitutive half-centuries. 
The state history score (s) is a composite measure of the type and territorial extent of statehood 
in the given 50-year period. Three dimensions are considered: 1. the level of governance (z1), 
2. the independence of government (z2), and 3. territorial coverage (z3). To each half-century-
country unit and dimension, a value between 0 and 1 is assigned based on historical records and 
archeological data. Thereafter, the state history scores are calculated as follows: 
1 2 3 50it it it its z z z= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , where i and t represent the country and the given half-century, respectively.9 

























 , where t = 0 is the half-century of 3500-3451 BCE.  
 
The last half-century (τ) can be set according to the focus of the analysis. In the baseline case 
(SH1950), we equate it to 108, which corresponds to the period from 1901 to 1950 CE. We omit 
the second half of the 20th century in order to avoid any endogeneity concern related to the state 
history index in our estimations. Another crucial point is the δ depreciation rate in equation (1). It 
is reasonable to assume that whatever the impacts of established statehood on culture, norms, and 
social structures are, they must partly fade away with time. The rate of this depreciation is a matter 
                                                          
8 Originally, Bockstette et al. (2002) constructed the state history index only for the last two millennia. 
9 The state history score is maximized at 50, which occurs when the greater part of the current territory of the 
country was ruled by a domestic government in the given 50 years. 
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of arbitrary choice. However, if the cumulated state history index is to proxy for antiquity, a low 
level of δ is needed. Otherwise, the difference between societies with ancient roots (e.g., Egypt) and 
relatively younger societies (e.g., France) decreases noticeably owing to the overwhelming 
dominance of the more recent centuries in the calculation. Figure 2 demonstrates this by contrasting 
the SH1950 indexes based on two alternative depreciation rates, 1 percent and 5 percent. 
The rationale for antiquity having an effect on present socio-economic outcomes is that 
societies with ancient roots are characterized by norms and values different from those of 
relatively younger societies. Hariri (2012) demonstrates that countries with a longer state 
history tend to be more centralized and autocratic and pursue more collectivist values. Lagerlöf 
(2016) also proposes that countries with an early statehood might be more autocratic. Olsson 
and Paik (2016) find that more ancient societies, with an earlier date of the Neolithic 
Revolution, tend to be more collectivist today. 
It is generally believed that values and norms relate more to people and less to the geographic 
area they inhabit. However, the institutions of a country can considerably influence the culture 
of its inhabitants. Indeed, the mutual impact of institutions and culture on each other is well-
known (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015). Consequently, it is uncertain whether the experience of 
the geographic area or the experience of its inhabitants – and their ancestors – counts more 
when it comes to the contemporary effect of antiquity. This issue is crucial since massive 
population flows occurred in the post-Columbian era leading to mixed societies, in terms of 
ancestral history and culture, in several countries.  
 
Figure 2. Evaporating antiquity: The effect of the applied depreciation rate 
 
Source: Own graph. For the data source, see Table A2. 
Notes: SH=SH1950 in the graph 
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Our baseline measure of antiquity considers the experience of the geographic area with 
established statehood. However, as an alternative measure, we also use the ancestry-adjusted state 
history index to see how the results change when the respective experience of the inhabitants is 
in focus. We compute the ancestry-adjusted state history index as the (normalized) sum of the 
weighted average of the pre-Columbian (i.e. 3500 BCE-1500 CE) state histories and the 
unadjusted post-Columbian (i.e. 1501-1950 CE) state history of the particular country:  
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where wij is the share of country j in country i’s year-1500AD ancestors as retrieved from the 
World Migration Matrix of Putterman and Weil (2010). As can be observed in Figure 3, the 
adjustment for the ancestral composition of the population considerably increases the state 
history index in those, mainly New World, countries which experienced massive post-
Columbian population flows. 
 
Figure 3. Ancestry: unadjusted vs adjusted state history 
 
Source: Own graph. For the data source, see Table A2. 
 
 
Another crucial point is whether pre-Columbian state history is preferable over total state 
history (i.e. including the post-Columbian ages). On the one hand, it is true that the long-lasting 
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effect of early development on contemporary socio-economic outcomes has solid foundations. 
On the other hand, it is hard to argue against the importance of post-Columbian experience 
concerning contemporary economic development. In any case, we use the pre-Columbian state 
history, both unadjusted (SH1500) and adjusted (SH1500adj) for ancestry, as an alternative 
measure of antiquity.10 
As a final alternative measure of antiquity, we consider the years elapsed since the Neolithic 
Revolution (AgrY) as compiled by Putterman and Trainor (2018) and used, inter alia, in 
Putterman and Weil (2010). This indicator appraises the number of years before 2000AD that 
have passed since a considerable share of the population in any area within the present border 
of countries started to meet their food needs largely from cultivation. The timing of agricultural 
transition is a common measure of early development in the DRD literature (e.g., Olsson and 
Hibbs, 2005). It is deemed as an approximation for the antiquity of societies due to the fact that 
the sedentary mode of agricultural production necessitated a much more well-organized society 
than hunting and gathering. Indeed, the first states were established in the Fertile Crescent, 
along with the spread of irrigation-based farming (Diamond, 1997). Figure 4 corroborates the 
strong co-movement of state history with agricultural years.  
Finally, we briefly discuss the cross-country relationship between state history and financial 
and economic development. Figure 5 is a scatterplot of state history and average domestic credit 
in the first decade of the 2000s. In accordance with Ang (2013), we find a moderately positive 
relationship between antiquity and financial development. In Figure 6, the seminal result of 
Borcan et al. (2018) on the inverted U-shaped relationship between antiquity and contemporary 




                                                          
10 SH1500 is calculated according to equation (1) with τ = 99 representing the half-century of 1450-1500AD. 
SH1500adj is calculated as follows: ( )( ) ( )99 9999 990 01500 (1 ) (1 ) 50t ti ij itj t tSH adj w sδ δ− −= == + ⋅ + ⋅∑ ∑ ∑ . 
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Figure 4. State history vs. Agricultural years 
 
Source: Own graph. For the data source, see Table A2. 
Figure 5. Financial development and antiquity 
 
Source: Own graph. For the data source, see Table A2. 
Figure 6. Economic development and antiquity 
 
Source: Own graph. For the data source, see Table A2.  
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4. A model of antiquity and finance 
The emergence of powerful interest groups that capture the financial system and generate the 
provision of soft budget constraints in their favor provides an explanatory mechanism for the 
negative effect of antiquity on the finance-growth nexus. In our proposed model, we 
complement Borcan et al. (2018) by establishing the financial development channel in order to 
elaborate on the inverted U-shaped relationship between state history and economic growth. 
High levels of state history correspond to economic systems with a long exposure to organized 
statehood and a culture of centralization. In contrast, low levels of state history reflect a more 
decentralized set of financial institutions and a recent exposure to organized statehood.  
To analyze the effect of antiquity on the finance-growth nexus and show in particular why 
very ancient societies exhibit soft budget constraints, which in return impair their growth, we 
consider a static game between a bank B and an entrepreneur E as per Dewatripont and Maskin 
(1995). State history is denoted by a stochastic variable Sα  such that 
{ }1,  and 1,S L Hα α α α α∈ = = >  where 
Hα corresponds to a high level of state history and Lα  
to a low level of state history. In the case of the soft budget constraint, the bank’s utility function 
is 2 ,B jSBCu r d= −  where 2r  denotes the bank’s return from refinancing the provided credit, 
jd  
is the size of the provided credit such that 2 1  and ;1
S
j j





( )0,1jλ ∈ denotes the 
bank’s monitoring of the credit provided to the entrepreneur. The higher the degree of 
monitoring imposed by the bank, the higher the overall amount of credit provided. Similarly, 
in the case of the soft budget constraint, the entrepreneur’s payoff is provided by 2 ,E jSBCu v d= +  
where 2v  is exogenous and denotes profit. When defining the status-quo and hard budget 
constraint payoffs for the bank and the entrepreneur, we assume that there is an opportunity 
cost for the bank if it decides not to provide credit to the entrepreneur. Furthermore, 0i ≥  is the 
bank’s initial endowment and θ  indicates the opportunity cost of the credit provision s.t. 
(0,1)θ ∈ . 
Hence, the static antiquity-capitalism game is defined as follows: 
1. Players: a bank B and an entrepreneur E such that { }, .N B E=  
2. States: { 1, },  where 1.i L Ht t tα α α α α∈ = = >  
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3. Strategies: { , }S H Lλ λΦ =  is the strategy set of the bank, where H refers to a high level 
of credit monitoring and L refers to a low level of credit monitoring such that 
( )0,1L Hλ λ< ∈ . 
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where 1 2.ν ν>  Under conditions of long state history (high state), a bad project entails a high 
monitoring cost on the part of the bank, both in the case of a soft and a hard budget constraint. 
State history measures antiquity of institutions and implies that an entrepreneur in the high state 
is more likely to capture the financial system and receive a soft budget constraint from the bank.  
The timing of the antiquity-capitalism game therefore has the following structure as per 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006): 
1. { , }i L Ht t tα α α∈  is revealed.  
2. The bank decides whether to provide credit to the entrepreneur with monitoring Lλ  
or revert to the status quo: {0,1}.ζ ∈   
3. The entrepreneur completes the project directly with probability µ  or requests 
refinancing with probability 1 µ−  such that (0,1) : {0,1}µ ξ∈ ∈ .11 If she completes 
the project, then the stage game is over. 
4. If the entrepreneur requests refinancing, then the bank decides whether to refinance 
the project (soft budget constraint) with probability η  or to terminate (hard budget 
constraint) with probability 1 η−  such that { }(0,1) : 0,1 .η χ∈ ∈ 12 In either case, the 
stage game is over. 
 
 
                                                          
11 ( 1)  and ( 0) 1 .P Pξ µ ξ µ= = = = −  







The entrepreneur receives credit from the bank under conditions of long state history if ,µ θ>
and 1 .r i>   
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Hence, the bank will prefer to provide credit to the entrepreneur if and only if: 
 
2
1 2( ) (1 ) (1 ) .1 1L H
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Now, we turn to the state history threshold and identify the antiquity condition under which the 
bank is captured by the entrepreneur and therefore provides a soft budget constraint. It is the 












Figure 7: The model tree 
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case that the bank provides a soft budget constraint rather than a hard budget constraint to the 
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 − − − −  <  and 1Lα =  is the lowest value of state antiquity, the 
solution that makes B BSBC HBCu u>  should be 2α . Hence, the threshold of state history that makes 
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Thus, α∗ increases with Hλ and decreases with θ .  
 
Proposition 1 

























 then the entrepreneur submits a bad project to the bank and the 
following equilibria come into play: 
a. If *α α≤ , then in either state the bank terminates an insolvent entrepreneur (hard 
budget constraint). 
b. If *α α> , then the bank refinances an insolvent entrepreneur under conditions of 
high credit monitoring Hλ  (soft budget constraint), while in the low state the bank 
terminates an insolvent entrepreneur (hard budget constraint). 
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In our model, we observe that for higher levels of state history, the financial system is more 
inclined toward the provision of soft budget constraints to inefficient entrepreneurs, and 
therefore it reinforces the emergence of entrenched interest groups that perpetuate its capture. 
In contrast, for lower levels of state history, the financial system is less inclined toward 
refinancing. Hardening the budget constraint of inefficient entrepreneurs allows the entry of 
new market players that may be more efficient and less dependent on credit. In the low state, 
the bank does not provide a soft budget constraint to the entrepreneur, but always terminates an 
inefficient entrepreneur by hardening her soft budget constraint with a low opportunity cost of 
lending. We suggest that antiquity in the form of state history may pose institutional barriers to 
financial development and entrepreneurship. 
Our model treats the opportunity cost of lending as an exogenous parameter. However, θ  
may in reality increase with state history. As we propose, in more ancient societies, interest 
groups are more powerful and capable of capturing the government and the financial sector. 
Under such conditions, the rejection of lending – either at the initial or at the refinancing stage 
– can cause larger costs for banks due to the larger scale of counteractions by government and 
business elite in the form of economic punishment. In our model, the threshold for soft budget 
constraint (α*) decreases with θ  and the probability of exceeding that threshold increases. This 
implies that the probability of a soft budget constraint is higher in societies with a longer state 
history and the finance-growth nexus might therefore be impaired. 
 
  




Figure 8: Comparative statics *( )α θ  
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5. Data & methodology 
Our panel data covers the period from 1970 to 2014. We work with 5-year panels in order to 
average-out business cycles, and are thus left with nine time periods (1970-74, 1975-79, etc.). 
As a rule, the only countries included in the sample are those possessing the required minimum 
number of time periods with complete observations in terms of the model variables. In the 
baseline case, this number is set at four, thus leaving us with a sample of 95 countries. The list 
of these countries is presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. When this condition is relaxed by 
reducing the minimum number of time periods with complete observations to 3, the number of 
included countries jumps to 118.  
Most of the variables are averaged over the 5-year intervals. As a rule, a minimum of three 
available observations is required within a 5-year period in order to calculate the period-average 
instead of reporting a missing value. The panel is unbalanced. Table A2 introduces the data and 
their sources. Table A3 and A4 present the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix, 
respectively.   
Based on our previous arguments in Figure 1, we pose the following hypotheses: 
H1: Antiquity transforms the finance-growth nexus. 
H2: The increase in outstanding credit impacts economic growth negatively in states with an 
ancient tradition of statehood. 
To test these hypotheses, we specify the following dynamic model: 
 
(3)   , , 1 1 , 2 , ,ln ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( )Ti t i t i i t i i t i t i ty y I AQ FD I AQ FD pβ α γ α γ φ µ ε−= + ≤ + > + + + +i,tControls  , 
 
where lny is log GDP per capita, AQ is the measure of antiquity, FD is the measure of financial 
development, Controls represents the control variables, μ is the country-fixed effect, p is the 
time-fixed effect, i and t are country- and time-indexes, respectively, and 2(0, )Nε σ . In the 
baseline model, antiquity is measured by the extended state history index of Borcan et al. (2018) 
calculated according to a 1-percent depreciation rate and terminated in 1950 (SH1950). 
We use two size-based measures of financial development: domestic credit and private credit 
by banks. The control variables include classic growth determinants such as human capital, 
physical capital investments, inflation, government consumption, social conflicts, and level of 
democracy. These variables are meant to control for the production capacities of the economy, 
soundness of economic policy, provision of public goods, social stability, and institutional 
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quality. The initial GDP per capita of the underlying period is included in the explanatory 
variables to control for conditional convergence.  
In equation (3), the I(.) indicator function takes the value 1 if the condition in the parenthesis 
is met, and 0 otherwise. We postulate two regimes in terms of antiquity, a bottom regime where 
the AQ is below the γ threshold level, and an upper regime where AQ exceeds γ. We are 
primarily interested in the alpha and gamma parameters. A difference in the sign and/or the 
significance of 1α  and 2α  would be a proof of our Hypothesis 1 that antiquity matters for the 
growth impact of financial development. Moreover, if 1 2α α>  were to hold, Hypothesis 2, 
arguing that antiquity is bad for the finance-growth nexus, would also be corroborated.  
We estimate equation (1) using the method of dynamic panel threshold regressions (DPTR). 
DPTR originates in panel threshold regressions (PTR) introduced by Hansen (1999, 2000). The 
concept of PTR is to estimate threshold models – like equation (3) – by picking the γ threshold 
which optimizes the underlying objective function. PTR was, however, originally developed 
for static models with exogenous explanatory variables. Caner and Hansen (2004) develop an 
instrumental variable approach to threshold models, but they assume cross-sectional data. 
Kremer at al. (2013) are the first to consider dynamic panel threshold models with endogenous 
explanatory variables. They adapt the method of Caner and Hansen (ibid.) on dynamic panel 
models and use forward orthogonal deviation to remove unobserved unit fixed effects. 
However, their procedure is of an applied nature lacking any theoretical proof. The theoretical 
foundations of endogenous dynamic panel threshold regressions are laid down by Seo and Shin 
(2016).  
Seo and Shin (ibid.) propose the estimation of equation (3) by GMM on first-differenced 
data. However, first-differencing has two major drawbacks. First, it artificially induces first-
order residual autocorrelation. Second, it aggravates the missing data problem in unbalanced 
panels due to its inability to perform data transformation in the immediate neighborhood of 
missing observations. To avoid these pitfalls of data transformation, we apply forward 
orthogonal deviation (henceforth FOD) as suggested in Kremer et al. (ibid.).13 In other respects, 
however, we closely follow the suggestions of Seo and Shin (ibid.): first, we locate the optimal 
value of the threshold variable by minimizing the 2-step GMM objective function for equation 
(3), and thereafter, in the second step, we rerun the 2-step GMM on equation (3), already 
                                                          
13 Forward orthogonal deviation, originally proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995), performs the following data 
transformation: 
( 1)
1 ( ... )
1it it i t iT
T tx x x x
T t T t
∗
+
−  = − + + − + − 
 , where T is the number of time units in the panel. 
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substituting the estimated threshold for γ. Concerning the above, our approach is a hybrid of 
that of Kremer et al. (2013) and that of Seo and Shin (2016).  
In each step of the estimation, we use the same GMM settings. Our internal instruments are 
the first- and second-order lags of endogenous explanatory variables in their original, i.e. not 
FOD-transformed, form. With the exception of the social conflict measure (Violence) which is 
considered to be strictly exogenous, all right-hand side variables are deemed to be endogenous 
after FOD-transformation. Beyond internal instruments, we also include external instruments 
such as legal origin, continent dummies, and latitude (see Table A2). Legal origin is a 
commonly accepted highly relevant instrument for financial development (Levine, 1999; La 
Porta et al., 2008), while geographic variables are intended to control for the unobserved unit 
specific variation in the explanatory variables.14 Concerning the weighting matrix, we assume 
clustered errors in our baseline estimations. 
6. Results 
The results of the two baseline models (models 1A & 1B), differing from each other only in 
terms of the financial development indicator, are presented in Tables 1A and 1B. As can be 
observed, the two models lead to similar conclusions. The control variables are mostly 
significant and have the expected sign. According to the overidentification test (J-test), the 
instruments are valid at standard levels in model 1A and at the 5-percent level in model 1B. In 
both models, the sign of the financial development coefficient differs across the two regimes: 
it is positive and significant at the 5-percent level in the bottom regime, while it is negative and 
significant at the 1-percent level in the upper regime. According to the respective Wald test, 
this difference between the effect of financial development on growth in the two regimes seems 
to be significant.  
These results corroborate our hypotheses. First, the Wald test rejects the H0 of there being 
the same effect of financial development on growth in old and young societies. Second, the sign 
and the significance of the financial development coefficient in the two regimes support our 
second hypothesis that the increase in outstanding credit is detrimental to growth in societies 
with ancient roots, while it is conducive to growth in younger ones. 
                                                          
14  Note, that it would be impossible to include these external IVs in the control variables because FOD-
transformation eliminates observed fixed effects too. 
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Table 1A. Results on Private Credit 
Models 1A 2A 3A 4A 5A 6A 7A 8A 9A 
Treshold variable SH1950 SH1950 SH1950 SH1950 SH1950adj  SH1500 SH1500adj AgrY AgrYadj 
depr. rate of SH 1 % 0 % 2 % 5 % 1 % 1% 1% Ø Ø 
lag(lny) 0.8786 0.8786 0.8786 0.8269 0.8598 0.8786 0.8437 0.8935 0.835  
(0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
ln(GFCF) -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0133 0.0047 -0.0049 -0.0054 -0.0481 -0.0264  
(0.912) (0.912) (0.912) (0.771) (0.91) (0.912) (0.921) (0.354) (0.614) 
lag(ln(HC)) 0.3563 0.3563 0.3563 0.3327 0.3833 0.3563 0.1804 0.3676 0.2137  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.01) (0.016) (0.107) (0.02) (0.076) 
ln(INFL) -0.0669 -0.0669 -0.0669 -0.078 -0.0725 -0.0669 -0.0815 -0.0522 -0.0772  
(0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) (0.01)  (0) 
ln(GovCons) 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.0548 0.0225 0.035 -0.021 0.0057 -0.033  
(0.408) (0.408) (0.408) (0.229) (0.578) (0.408) (0.601) (0.901) (0.434) 
Violence -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.0028 -0.0035 -0.003 -0.0037 -0.0021 -0.0036  
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.007)  (0)  (0.001)  (0) (0.069)  (0) 
Polity2 0.0059 0.0059 0.0059 0.0073 0.0045 0.0059 0.004 0.006 0.0047  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.033) (0.007) (0.116) (0.006) (0.054) 
ln(PCB_bottom) 0.0826 0.0826 0.0826 0.0757 0.0695 0.0826 0.1461 0.085 0.1161  
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.03) (0.046) (0.018) (0.014) (0.029)  (0.021) 
ln(PCB_upper) -0.1008 -0.1008 -0.1008 -0.0959 -0.1237 -0.1008 -0.0804 -0.0865 -0.0653  
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001)  (0)  (0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.04) 
Wald test (pv) 0.157 0.153 0.073 0.020      
γ 0.216 0.147 0.289 0.510 0.276 0.144 0.037 4000 3549 
SH quartile Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q2 
N 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 536 
no. of countries 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 
J-test (pv) 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.172 0.201 0.291 0.112 0.128 0.070 
no. of IVs 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Notes: Robust p-values are in brackets. The H0 of the Wald test is 1 2α α= . For the individual tests, only the p-values (pv) are presented. The p-value of the 
Wald test is based on bootstrapping. SH quartile shows the quartile to which γ falls. External IVs: legal origin dummies, continent dummies, latitude. Internal 




Table 1B. Results on Domestic Credit 
Models 1B 2B 3B 4B 5B 6B 7B 8B 9B 
Treshold variable SH1950 SH1950 SH1950 SH1950 SH1950adj  SH1500 SH1500adj AgrY AgrYadj 
depr. rate of SH 1 % 0 % 2 % 5 % 1 % 1% 1% Ø Ø 
lag(lny) 0.8681 0.8681 0.8681 0.8475 0.8612 0.8681 0.8265 0.8649 0.8175  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(GFCF) 0.0083 0.0083 0.0083 0.0188 0.0242 0.0083 0.0021 -0.0366 -0.0053  
(0.862) (0.862) (0.862) (0.688) (0.603) (0.862) (0.967) (0.491) (0.919) 
lag(ln(HC)) 0.3326 0.3326 0.3326 0.2724 0.3275 0.3326 0.1896 0.3475 0.1998  
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.036) (0.021) (0.018) (0.1) (0.018) (0.104) 
ln(INFL) -0.0886 -0.0886 -0.0886 -0.0976 -0.0718 -0.0886 -0.073 -0.0759 -0.0715  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln(GovCons) 0.0552 0.0552 0.0552 0.0657 0.0407 0.0552 -0.0208 0.0225 -0.0273  
(0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.159) (0.303) (0.203) (0.622) (0.634) (0.529) 
Violence -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.003 -0.0034 -0.0029 -0.0034 -0.0022 -0.0033  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.066) (0.003) 
Polity2 0.0059 0.0059 0.0059 0.007 0.0049 0.0059 0.0048 0.0059 0.0056  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.008) (0.003) (0.035) (0.003) (0.009) 
ln(DC_bottom) 0.0709 0.0709 0.0709 0.0532 0.0534 0.0709 0.168 0.0696 0.1193  
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.051) (0.067) (0.014) (0.005) (0.026) (0.024) 
ln(DC_upper) -0.0864 -0.0864 -0.0864 -0.1012 -0.1092 -0.0864 -0.0398 -0.0663 -0.0258  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.001) (0.000) (0.01) (0.165) (0.042) (0.389) 
Wald test (pv) 0.097 0.200 0.097 0.017 0.035 0.130 0.275 0.105 0.165 
γ 0.216 0.147 0.289 0.5101 0.276 0.144 0.037 4000 3549 
SH quartile Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q1 Q3 Q2 
N 544 544 544 544 544 544 544 544 544 
no. of countries 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 
J-test (pv) 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.052 0.067 0.076 0.021 0.024 0.015 
no. of IVs 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Notes: See Table 1A
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In order to fix any concern on the sensitivity of our results to the underlying antiquity measure, we 
also run the estimation of equation (3) for the other antiquity measures discussed in Section 3. In 
models 2# to 4#, we use the state history index of the last 6 millennia calculated according to different 
depreciation rates. Although the dispersion of the index is very much impacted by the applied 
depreciation rate, the estimation results are fairly stable. The underlying reason is that although a 
higher depreciation rate squeezes the index values to some extent, it leaves the relative ranking of 
countries – the important aspect of the distribution from the viewpoint of DPTR – mostly untouched 
(see Figure 2). Note, however, that the estimated thresholds differ considerably from each other even 
if they represent similar quantile of the distribution of state history. This is the result of the complete 
rescaling of accumulated state history triggered by the change in the depreciation rate. 
In model 5#, we use the ancestry-adjusted state history index calculated according to equation (2) 
as the threshold variable. With this threshold variable, we account for the post-Columbian population 
flows and relate antiquity more to the people than to the geographic area. As already discussed, this 
adjustment changes the relative position of several New World countries in the distribution of state 
history (see Figure 3). Despite this, the results are remarkably similar to the baseline case.15 
In models 6# and 7#, the threshold variable is the pre-Columbian state history either in original or 
in ancestry-adjusted form. The results are in line with the baseline ones owing to the fact that the 
order of pre-Columbian state histories coincides largely with that of overall state histories. To put it 
differently, the experience with established statehood in the post-Columbian era does not add much 
to the ranking of countries in terms of state history. 
Finally, in models 8# and 9#, agricultural years are used as the threshold variable either in original 
or in ancestry-adjusted form. The high positive correlation of agricultural years with state history 
produces similar results to the baseline ones. 
Identically to the case with the threshold effect, the estimated coefficients also show considerable 
consistency over the different threshold and financial development variables. The underlying reason 
is that the individual estimates group the countries into the two regimes in a similar way owing to the 
strong positive correlation of the antiquity measures. In both regimes, the effect of financial 
development is important economically. Considering the baseline results, a 10-percent increase in 
private credit tends to accelerate the (cumulated) growth rate over the underlying 5-year period by 
0.8 percentage points in the bottom regime (young societies) and decelerate it by 1 percentage point 
in the upper regime (ancient societies). In the case of domestic credit and the other antiquity measures, 
similar magnitudes characterize the growth impact of financial development. 
                                                          
15 Note that the estimated threshold value is again not comparable to the baseline one due to its different scale. 
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To conclude, in accordance with the theoretical model, the empirical analysis proves our two initial 
hypotheses. Antiquity impacts the finance-growth nexus by rendering the increase in the amount of 
outstanding credit detrimental to growth in societies with ancient roots. On the other hand, in younger 
societies, the marginal effect of financial development on growth is positive – as the traditional 
finance-growth literature would suggest. This result holds irrespective of the measure of antiquity.  
One point is worth emphasizing: our results are not a simple reincarnation of the literature on 
institutional quality, economic development, and finance. Although some of the world’s oldest 
societies are located in the underdeveloped Middle East, there are also leading examples of antiquity 
in developed countries such as Greece, Italy or South Korea. Indeed, in our baseline estimations, both 
the bottom and the upper regimes of state history include a mix of developed and developing countries 
(see Table A1). Therefore, the general argument of the literature that financial development is more 
conducive to growth in countries with better institutions or with a higher level of economic 
development is clearly irrelevant in our case. In contrast to the conventional institutional quality 
literature, the economic story behind our results is more about informal institutions rather than formal 
ones. Its about the latent rent-seekers who may render institutional systems extractive – even those 
systems with a relatively high score of institutional quality according to standard measures – provided 
that they are powerful enough to do so. 
7. Discussion 
Our results establish a robust relationship between antiquity, in the form of accumulated exposure to 
state and centralized institutions, and one of the main pillars of capitalism: the banking sector. We 
provide overwhelming evidence that the lending activity of banks is less conducive to economic 
growth in countries with a long state history. The malfunctioning of the finance-growth nexus can be 
attributed to the enhanced power of the business and political elites to capture the financial sector and 
corrupt lending under the condition of antiquity. In line with the literature, we conjecture that interest 
groups are entrenched deeper and have increased bargaining power at their disposal in economies 
with a long state history (Borcan et al., 2018; Lagerlöf, 2016). In our model, we present the 
dependence of banks’ lending activity on antiquity. The case studies of Italy and South Korea also 
provide some underpinning of our argument. However, the deep entrenchment and the persistent 
survival of interest groups in older societies is still rather a supposition than a thoroughly explored 
stylized fact in the literature. This section provides some evidence on the rationale for this assumption. 
In doing so, we focus on the distinguishing features of societies with an ancient statehood in terms of 
social dynamics, culture, and institutions. 
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Early starters in state organization were able to dominate territories and extract resources for the 
benefit of their elites and the consolidation of their military power. These ancient autocratic regimes 
were characterized by advanced political and economic hierarchies. A long tradition of centralization 
resulted in social norms which are conformable with elite rule and vested political interests and are 
deeply settled at the same time. Owing to this, these societies were more effectively able to resist the 
changing strategic and economic environment resulting from the appearance of competing states, the 
replacement of old empires, the monetization of economic activities, and the rise of novel types of 
political-economic organizations on their territories (e.g., democracy in ancient Athens, imperial 
mercantilism in medieval Venice). This resistance also means that the elite-based social structure of 
countries with ancient roots has been less influenced by the emergence of modern capitalist markets 
and democratic regimes. The persistence of social norms enable the survival of elite-rule in the form 
of informal networks, cronyism, and state capture in the modern era too. Hence, antiquity in economic 
terms becomes equivalent to a set of institutional and inter-generationally transmitted constraints that 
may undermine the primacy of competitive markets and result in impaired functioning of some crucial 
aspects of capitalism, such as the finance-growth nexus.  
 The probable survival of oligarchic social structures and accommodating social norms has also 
been supported by the collectivist culture of societies with ancient statehood. Olsson and Paik (2016) 
explore robust positive correlation between agricultural years since the Neolithic Revolution and 
cultural collectivism. They argue that the sequential spread of sedentary agriculture was transmitted 
by the step-by-step outmigration of the most individualist people from the Middle East toward 
Northern Europe and other regions. Moreover, since climatic conditions were rather favorable for 
individualist agriculture in the temperate zone, collectivist social norms were not needed compared 
to the Fertile Crescent where agriculture was based on irrigation (Diamond, 1997). Sedentary 
agriculture was a major trigger for the formation of states. The above therefore also explains why 
countries with a longer state history tend to be more collectivist (Hariri, 2012). 
 As opposed to personal freedom and horizontal relationships in individualist societies, collectivism 
is characterized by the embeddedness of the individual in the community, hierarchical structures, and 
loyalty toward the group (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2017). Individualist societies are driven more 
by general morality and legal rules, while collectivist societies operate more on the basis of reciprocal 
moral obligations and personal connections. As a consequence, in collectivist societies informal 
personalized enforcement mechanisms may dominate the formal rules. All these characteristics are 
conducive to the survival and perpetuation of elite networks. 
 Another argument in favor of the perpetuation of elite-based social structures in older countries is 
the growing empirical evidence of their long-run survival. Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila (2016) 
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investigate how the speed of the Reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula affected the political and social 
structures established in the newly regained territories. They argue that in regions which were 
reconquered relatively fast, ‘colonization’ remained incomplete and resulted in the concentration of 
power in the hands of the political elite, the nobles. They demonstrate that this oligarchic centralized 
social structure survived until the industrial revolution in the late 19th century and is one of the main 
reasons behind the current underdevelopment of the respective Spanish regions. In another recent 
study, Greif and Tabellini (2017) demonstrate that social organization was historically characterized 
by patrilineal kin-based clans in China. These clans were abolished when the communist regime 
gained power in 1949. However, after the regime stopped persecuting them in 1979, clans re-emerged 
and proliferated. The authors see the latter as evidence of cultural persistence actively shaping the 
organization of societies.  
 The survival of social structures is further underpinned by the adaptive formation of formal 
institutions. Indeed, it has already been pointed out that social norms and values (culture) and 
institutions mutually influence each other (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015; Nunn, 2014). In his seminal 
paper, Greif (1994) demonstrates how the differing cultural beliefs of medieval Genoese and 
Maghribi traders shaped their respective societies. Acemoglu et al. (2001) emphasize the importance 
of European settlers in terms of the type of institutions that were established in the new colonies. As 
regards the opposite causation – running from institutions toward social norms and values – the 
empirical evidence is also abundant. Becker et al. (2016) explore the long-term positive legacy of the 
Habsburg Empire on the general trust toward bureaucracy and police in the successor states. Lowes 
et al. (2017) investigate the long-term effect of early centralized institutions on contemporary cultural 
norms through the evidence of the Kuba Kingdom and find that developed institutions in the past 
result in weaker norms of rule following and a greater propensity to cheat for material gain in the 
present. Tabellini (2008) builds a model in which institutions and culture both evolve endogenously, 
mutually shaping each other. 
 To sum up, there is strong evidence in the literature that countries with ancient roots are more 
collectivist and thereby the dominance of powerful elites is more likely to survive. Moreover, the 
establishing oligarchic economic and political conditions are further reinforced by the dynamic 
interplay of institutions and culture: a collectivist society captured by some major interest groups can 
easily find itself in a bad equilibrium where formal rules based on general morality are dominated by 
personalized informal rules and hierarchical within-group structures.  
Finally, we want to point out that antiquity is not necessarily a subordinated system. The logic of 
antiquity appears to be similar to the logic of the soft budget constraint, whose efficiency is rejected 
ex-ante, but confirmed ex-post. While antiquity generates conditions for the inefficient provision of 
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credit due to elite capture and entrenched interest groups, it is essential to keep in mind that it also 
may provide an alternative path to economic efficiency, as it is not possible to undo or disregard the 
ancient roots of societies. In societies with a longer horizon of state history, it is costlier to replace 
hierarchical institutions with horizontal ones than to have an impaired financial system captured by 
established elites. This observation is also in line with the collectivism-individualism dichotomy. 
Individualist societies are more likely to be richer than collectivist societies. However, this may not 
always be the case. Antiquity prevents a capitalist development based on market-based finance, but 
this does not preclude the existence of alternative developmental paths that can be relatively 
successful in capitalism. The latter question goes beyond the scope of our paper and may be the topic 
of future research.  
8. Sensitivity analysis 
This section conducts the sensitivity analyses of the results. We are primarily interested in the 
sensitivity to the estimation method, the sample, the threshold effect, and the control variables. In 
advance, the sensitivity analyses show that the results are robust to these issues. In order to save space, 
we present only the sensitivity analyses in the case of private credit. The results of domestic credit 
are very similar and are available in the Appendix (Tables A5-A8.). 
 As regards the estimation methodology, we investigate the sensitivity to the defining 
characteristics of the GMM estimation such as the set of IVs and the assumption on the weighting 
matrix. The results are presented in Table 2. In sensitivity checks S1A and S2A, we change the set of 
external IVs first by dropping geography related variables (S1A), and then by discarding legal origin 
dummies too (S2A). As can be observed, the impact of private credit in the two regimes is not 
sensitive to the inclusion of external instruments. In sensitivity check S3A, we keep the external 
instruments unchanged but restrict the internal IVs to the first order lag of untransformed right-hand 
side variables. The results concerning the coefficient of private credit in the two regimes are similar 
to the baseline case. Finally, we switch from clustered errors to heteroskedastic errors and adjust the 
weighting matrix used for the second step of GMM accordingly (S4A). The conclusion concerning 
the threshold effect of antiquity holds in this case too. 
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Table 2. Sensitivity to the GMM settings 
Sens. check S1A S2A S3A S4A 
Weighting matrix default default default cross-country & -time 
heteroskedasticity 
Internal IV default default 1st order lags default 
External IV legal origin none default defaut 
Control variables: lag(lny), ln(GFCF), lag(ln(HC)), ln(INFL), ln(GovCons), Violence, Polity2 
ln(PCB_bottom) 0.0989 0.115 0.143 0.0746  
(0.015) (0.018) (0.002) (0.054) 
ln(PCB_upper) -0.0859 -0.088 -0.0738 -0.1041  
(0.009) (0.035) (0.08) (0.000) 
Wald test (pv) 0.103 0.080 0.073 0.097 
γ 0.216 0.108 0.204 0.216 
SH quartile Q3 Q2 Q3 Q3 
N 536 536 604 536 
no. of countries 93 93 93 93 
Jstat (pv) 0.186 0.136 0.842 0.048 
no. of IVs 26 23 25 32 
Notes: Robust p-values are in brackets. For further notes, see Table 1A. 
 
Three issues can be raised concerning the sensitivity to the sample: the sensitivity to the time span, 
the country set, and the inclusion of countries according to the required minimum number of complete 
observations. In the baseline case, the only countries we keep in the sample are those with at least 
four time periods containing complete observations in terms of the baseline variables. In sensitivity 
check S5A, we increase this threshold to six periods of complete observation. The results are 
unchanged despite the fact that the number of included countries decreased considerably (Table 3). 
When we loosen the condition of inclusion to three complete observations, the number of countries 
increases noticeably – to 117 (S6A). However, the results remain similar to the baseline case. Another 
sign of robustness to the inclusion threshold is that, in both sensitivity checks, the estimated threshold 
value of state history is the same as in the baseline model.  
 We perform two sensitivity checks in relation to the time span. First, we drop the last 5-year period 
(2005-09) to avoid any distortions related to the global financial crisis (S7A). The significant 
threshold effect in the finance-growth nexus remains, but the estimated threshold value of the state 
history index is considerably lower than in the baseline case, falling this time into the second quartile 
of the underlying sample distribution. Second, we drop the 1970s to exclude the turbulent decade of 
oil crises and to focus on the post-Keynesian period of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization 
(S8A). This is important because one might be concerned about the distorting effect of state-owned 
banks, which actually dominated the financial landscape before the turnaround in mainstream 
economics at the beginning of the 1980s. Namely, one might argue that antiquity counts only when 
market forces are constrained by state ownership. As the results show, this is not the case, with the 
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main conclusions being valid for this limited time span too. Moreover, the estimated threshold value 
of state history is also unchanged.  
 Finally, we investigate the sensitivity to the country sample. One might argue that the effect of 
antiquity on the finance-growth nexus might be driven by developing countries or some other groups 
of countries. In sensitivity checks S9A and S10A, model (1) is estimated separately for developed 
and developing countries. Although, in each case, private credit continues to weigh positively for 
growth in the bottom regime, it loses significance.16 However, in both cases, the significant negative 
effect of private credit is preserved in the upper regime. These results corroborate our previous 
reasoning that the antiquity-capitalism nexus is not another representation of the well-known 
institutional approach suggesting that the finance-growth nexus is impaired in antique societies due 
to their lower level of economic and institutional development. As a second round of the sensitivity 
check to the country sample, we also drop groups of countries according to their territorial affiliation. 
Five scenarios are considered (S11A-S15A): estimation without Latin American & Caribbean, Asian, 
Sub-Saharan, Middle East & North African, and Western countries. As the results in Table 3 show, 
for each constrained country sample the impact of antiquity follows the same pattern as in the baseline 
case. 
 In the third type of sensitivity check, we investigate whether the impaired finance-growth nexus 
holds when a threshold effect is allowed for other explanatory variables too. In order to avoid an 
adverse increase in the number of regression parameters, beyond financial development, a threshold 
effect is introduced for other control variables one-by-one: 
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where { }* *:  , X X X− = ∈ ∉Controls Controls Controls Controls . Equation (4) differs from 
equation (3) in also allowing for a threshold effect in control variable X. The rationale is that the 
baseline results on the threshold effect in the finance-growth nexus might be driven by the omitted 
possible threshold effects in terms of the other control variables. The results are presented in Table 4.  
 
                                                          
16 However, notice that the number of countries in the two groups is much lower than in the baseline case, leading to less 
precise estimations. 
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Table 3. Sensitivity to the sample 
Sens. check S5A S6A S7A S8A S9A S10A S11A S12A S13A S14A S15A 
Complete obs. (min.) 6 3 default default default default default default default default default 
Period default default 1970-2004 1980-2009 default default default default default default default 
Countries default default default default Developed Developing w/o LAC w/o Asia w/o MENA w/o SSA w/o West 
Control variables: lag(lny), ln(GFCF), lag(ln(HC)), ln(INFL), ln(GovCons), Violence, Polity2 
ln(PCB_bottom) 0.0836 0.0685 0.1147 0.079 0.0214 0.0346 0.1108 0.0763 0.0709 0.0114 0.0731  
(0.017) (0.047) (0.007) (0.066) (0.421) (0.417) (0.004) (0.025) (0.032) (0.722) (0.047) 
ln(PCB_upper) -0.0805 -0.1113 -0.0614 -0.1073 -0.062 -0.0908 -0.0501 -0.1256 -0.1335 -0.08 -0.0775  
(0.009) (0) (0.034) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.138) (0) (0) (0.001) (0.072) 
Wald test (pv) 0.225 0.087 0.090 0.103 0.193 0.037 0.040 0.075 0.165 0.055 0.080 
γ 0.216 0.216 0.112 0.216 0.104 0.216 0.108 0.228 0.216 0.251 0.481 
SH quartile Q3 Q3 Q2 Q3 Q2 Q3 Q2 Q3 Q3 Q2 Q4 
N 510 562 440 466 333 203 399 459 481 407 416 
no. of countries 81 117 84 93 54 39 73 81 83 66 72 
Jstat (pv) 0.225 0.290 0.179 0.188 0.119 0.786 0.199 0.486 0.299 0.013 0.377 
no. of IVs 32 32 31 30 32 28 31 31 31 31 30 
Notes: Robust p-values are in brackets. Developed countries: high income & upper-middle income countries, Developing countries: low income & lower-middle income countries. For 
further notes, see Table 1A. 
Notations: LAC – Latin America & the Caribbean, MENA – Middle East & North Africa, SSA – Sub-Saharan Africa, West – Europe & North America 
 
Table 4. Sensitivity to the threshold effect 
Sens. check S16A S17A S18A S19A S20A S21A 
X with.threshold effect lag(lny) lnGFCF lag(lnHC) ln(INFL) ln(GovCons) Polity2 
Control variables: lag(lny), ln(GFCF), lag(ln(HC)), ln(INFL), ln(GovCons), Violence, Polity2 
ln(PCB_bottom) 0.0230 0.0322 0.0606 0.0666 0.0446 0.0773  
(0.421) (0.199) (0.017) (0.019) (0.142) (0.026) 
ln(PCB_upper) -0.0518 -0.0819 -0.0714 -0.0952 -0.0461 -0.0713  
(0.099) (0.015) (0.044) (0.006) (0.098) (0.022) 
ln(X_bottom) 0.8976 -0.0097 0.2802 -0.0269 0.2456 0.0079 
 (0.000) (0.866) (0.035) (0.292) (0.001) (0.002) 
ln(X_upper) 0.8027 0.3260 0.2746 -0.1878 -0.2115 0.0037 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.019) (0.003) (0.008) (0.264) 
γ 0.216 0.216 0.204 0.226 0.216 0.216 
SH quartile Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 
Jstat (pv) 0.084 0.072 0.159 0.166 0.175 0.244 
Notes: Robust p-values are in brackets. In each case, N=536, no. of countries = 93, no. of IVs = 32. For further notes, see Table 1A. 
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In the case of the lagged GDP per capita, the lagged human capital, and Polity2, there does 
not seem to be any threshold effect (S16A, S18A, S21A). In the case of the other control 
variables, antiquity seems to matter in a contradictory way. In antique societies, inflation is 
more costly and government consumption retards growth – instead of enhancing it (S19A & 
S20A). So, from the perspective of the effect of these two policy variables, antiquity is 
detrimental just as in the case of financial development. On the other hand, as far as the effect 
of investments is concerned, antiquity is conducive (S17A). These additional threshold effects 
suggest that beyond the finance-growth nexus, antiquity potentially impacts the contemporary 
functioning of capitalism through other channels as well. The underlying mechanisms are a 
subject for future research.17 Nevertheless, at the moment, the most important result is that the 
revealed threshold effect in the finance-growth nexus is not sensitive to the inclusion of other 
channels. In each extension, private credit continues to be positive in the bottom regime, 
although not always in a significant way, and significantly negative at the 10-percent level in 
the upper regime. 
The final sensitivity check considers the control variables. We add the total volume of trade 
(lnTrade), the balance of trade (BoT), and a banking crisis measure to the baseline model one-
by-one.18 The banking crisis measure is of particular interest since the finance-growth nexus 
might be impaired by financial crises in the short run, and so it is important to control for such 
events (Loayza and Rancière, 2006). Despite this, we decided not to include the banking crisis 
measure in the baseline model since it is a simple sum of the dummy of crisis events, compiled 
by Laeven and Valencia (2018), in the underlying five-year period and can therefore be only 
considered as a fairly crude proxy for the economic consequences of financial collapse. As can 
be observed in Table 5, although the volume of trade and banking crisis are significant control 
variables, the results concerning the effect of antiquity on the finance-growth nexus are 
unchanged in each case (S22A-S24A). 
As a final check, we also add the interaction of private credit with Polity2 in order to 
condition the effect of the former on the latter. Polity2 is a proxy for institutional quality, and 
so sensitivity check S25A addresses the concern whether our results are driven by the 
conditionality of the effect of financial development on institutional quality. It turns out not to 
                                                          
17 In the case of government consumption, the adverse effect of antiquity might be explained by similar arguments 
as in the case of the finance-growth nexus: in more ancient societies rent-seeking is more prevalent, the state tends 
to be captured by interest groups leading to corruption in government spending, and an impaired growth effect of 
the latter. 
18 For the sources of these data, see Table A1.  
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be the case: the threshold effect in the finance-growth nexus is unchanged, while the introduced 
interaction proves to be highly insignificant.  
Table 5. Sensitivity to the control variables 
Sens. scenario S22A S23A S24A S25A 
Add. control lnTrade BoT Banking crisis lnPCB*Polity2 
Control variables: lag(lny), ln(GFCF), lag(ln(HC)), ln(INFL), ln(GovCons), Violence, Polity2 
Add. control -0.1352 0.0014 -0.0237 -0.001 
 (0.014) (0.629) (0.000) (0.674) 
ln(PCB_bottom) 0.069 0.0788 0.0555 0.0849  
(0.078) (0.044) (0.100) (0.016) 
ln(PCB_upper) -0.0997 -0.1141 -0.0362 -0.1056  
(0.002) (0) (0.087) (0.000) 
Wald test (pv) 0.093 0.060 0.053 0.157 
γ 0.216 0.216 0.135 0.216 
SH quartile Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 
N 536 536 431 536 
no. of countries 93 93 82 93 
Jstat (pv) 0.534 0.331 0.210 0.264 
no. of IVs 34 34 32 34 
Notes: Robust p-values are in brackets. For further notes, see Table 1A.  
9. Conclusions 
This paper investigated the long-run persistent effect of antiquity on the working of capitalism. 
It did so by exploring the conditioning effect of antiquity, i.e. the length of established statehood 
and centralized institutions, on the finance-growth nexus. The effect of financial development 
on economic growth has long been in the focus of economists since the efficient operation of 
financial markets is decisive in terms of the performance of capitalism. An efficient financial 
sector allocates the savings of the society to the most promising investment projects. In this 
paper, we argue that the latter is harmed in countries with ancient roots, leading to an impaired 
finance-growth nexus at the macroeconomic level. In older societies, interest groups might be 
more entrenched and political and economic elites might be more powerful due to the 
persistence of hierarchical social structures enhanced by antiquity. This leads to extractive 
(informal) institutions and the continuous endeavor of the elite for access to easy credit. As a 
result, corruption in lending tends to be more widespread, thus maintaining a modern form of 
soft budget constraint.  
 To prove our theory, we followed a two-step strategy. First, we modelled the conditionality 
of the firm-bank relationship on antiquity and introduced the mechanism through which a soft 
budget constraint might characterize older societies to a larger extent. Thereafter, we examined 
empirically whether the growth impact of the amount of outstanding credit does indeed differ 
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in older and younger societies, and if so, in what way. To do this, we resorted to the method of 
dynamic panel threshold regressions. We applied different variants of the state history index of 
the last six millennia, constructed by Borcan et al. (2018), and the agricultural years since the 
Neolithic Revolution, constructed by Putterman and Trainor (2018), as the threshold variable 
in the estimations. The sample embraced 118 countries and 45 years (1970-2014). The results 
corroborate our hypothesis robustly: the finance-growth nexus is considerably impaired in older 
societies. We found that while the traditionally assumed positive growth effect of financial 
development holds in younger societies, this effect becomes outright negative in societies with 
a long history of established statehood. Based on our theoretical model and empirical results, 
we deliver robust evidence on the negative effect of antiquity on the finance-growth nexus and 
thereby on capitalism too. 
 Our paper contributes to the literature in several respects. First, we provide a profound 
establishment of the legacy perspective in the non-linear finance-growth literature. Second, we 
unveil the deep historical roots of corruption in lending. Third, we contribute to the opening of 
the black-box of the DRD literature by elaborating a channel through which history might exert 
its persistent effect on current socio-economic outcomes. To date, most of the studies in the 
DRD literature have focused on the determining effect of historical shocks on contemporary 
level of development. Much less effort has been devoted to understanding the mechanisms 
underlying this. A popular explanation is the persistence of culture and social norms. This 
approach appears in the background of our argumentation as well. However, our study tried to 
be more operative by unveiling a concrete economic mechanism related to the malfunctioning 
of capitalism under the condition of antiquity, the finance-growth nexus. As our empirical 
results demonstrated, there are other promising alternative channels as well that might help to 
open up the black-box of the deep roots of economic development further, such as the 
investment-growth nexus or the government expenditures-growth nexus. The exploration of 
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Table A1. The list of countries 
Baseline set of countries Additional 23 countries included 
in sensitivity checks S6# 
Algeria Dominican Rep. Korea, Rep. Saudi Arabia Albania 
Argentina Ecuador Madagascar Senegal Armenia 
Australia Egypt Malawi Sierra Leone Benin 
Austria El Salvador Malaysia Singapore Cambodia 
Bangladesh Fiji Mali South Africa Croatia 
Belgium Finland Mauritius Spain Czech Republic 
Bolivia France Mexico Sri Lanka Estonia 
Botswana Gabon Morocco Sudan (former) Germany 
Brazil Gambia Mozambique Swaziland Haiti 
Bulgaria Ghana Nepal Sweden Kazakhstan 
Burkina Faso Greece Netherlands Switzerland Kyrgyzstan 
Burundi Guatemala New Zealand Syrian Arab Rep. Latvia 
Cameroon Honduras Nicaragua Tanzania Lithuania 
Canada Hungary Niger Thailand Moldova 
Central African Rep. India Nigeria Togo Mongolia 
Chile Indonesia Norway Trinidad & Tobago Romania 
China Iran, Islamic Rep. Pakistan Tunisia Russia 
Colombia Ireland Panama Turkey Slovakia 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Israel Paraguay Uganda Slovenia 
Congo, Rep. Italy Peru United Kingdom Ukraine 
Costa Rica Jamaica Philippines United States Vietnam 
Cote d'Ivoire Japan Poland Uruguay Yemen 
Cyprus Jordan Portugal Venezuela Zimbabwe 
Denmark Kenya Rwanda   
Notes: In the case of private credit, the baseline country sample does not include Bangladesh and the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. 
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Table A2. Data description and sources 
Variable Notation Unit Data source Notes 
GDP per capita y USD  
(PPP, 2011 prices) 
PWT9.0 Own calculation based on population data and real GDP at PPP using national accounts growth 
rates (rgdpna) – both series are taken from PWT 9.0. 
Private credit PCB % of GDP GFDD  
 
Private credit by deposit money banks (code: GFDD.DI.01) 
Domestic credit DC % of GDP GFDD Domestic credit to the private sector (code: GFDD.DI.14) 
Gross fixed capital formation GFCF % of GDP WDI (code: NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS) 
Human capital index HC index PWT9.0 Index of human capital per person, based on years of schooling and returns to education. 
The level of human capital increases with the index. 
Inflation (price index) INFL  WDI 100 + annual average change of consumer prices (code: FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG) 
General government final consumption 
expenditure 
GovCons % of GDP WDI code: NE.CON.GOVT.ZS 
Balance of foreign trade BoT % of GDP WDI Code: NE.RSB.GNFS.ZS 
Volume of foreign trade Trade % of GDP WDI  import + export of goods and services (code: NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS) 
Banking crisis Banking crisis [0 ; 5] Laeven and Valencia 
(2018) 
The original data is a dummy variable taking on value 1 if there was a systemic banking crisis 
in the given year, 0 otherwise. In the 5-year panel, the sum of the underlying years is used. 
The level of democracy/autocracy Polity2 [-10 ; 10] Polity IV database 
Center for Systemic Peace 
Combined measure of democracy and autocracy. The level of democracy (autocracy) 
increases (decreases) with the index. 
Social violence Violence [ 0 ; 300] Major Episodes of Political 
Violance (1946-2018) 
Center for Systemic Peace 
The total measure of international, civil and ethnic warfare and violence (code: actotal). 
The magnitude of violence increases with the index. In the 5-year panel, the sum of the 
underlying years is used, scaling up the original index range [0 ; 60] accordingly. 
State history index SH# [0 ; 1] Borcan et al. (2018) The length of established statehood on the present territory of a country increases with the index 
# = 1950 / 1950adj / 1500 / 1500adj 
1950: period included: 3500BCE-1950CE 
1500: period included: 3500BCE-1500CE 
adj: adjustment for ancestry based on the World Migration Matrix (1500-2000, version 1.1) of 
Putterman and Weil (2010).  
For further details, see Section 3. 
Agricultural years AgrY#  Putterman and Trainor 
(2018) 
The number of years since the Neolithic Revolution 
# = none / adj 
adj: adjustment for ancestry based on the World Migration Matrix (1500-2000, version 1.1) of 
Putterman and Weil (2010).  
For further details, see Section 3. 
Legal origin dummies -  La Porta et al. (2008) German, French, English, and Scandinavian legal origins are distinguished 
Continent dummies -  own categorization Constructed dummies: Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East & North Africa, Europe, Latin 
America & the Caribbean (North America and Oceania constiute the reference group.) 
Latitude   Spolaore and Wacziarg 
(2013) 
Latitude for the centroid (center point) of a country 
Notes: PWT 9.0 – Penn World Table (version 9.0) (Feenstra at el., 2015); WDI – World Development Indicators database (World Bank); GFDD – Global Financial Development Database (World Bank)
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Table A3. Correlation matrix of the baseline sample: 95 countries (see Table A1.) & 1970-2014 (5-year periods)  
 








SH1950adj SH1500 SH1500adj AgrY AgrYadj lnGFCF lag(lnHC) lnINFL lnGovC Violence Polity2 lnTrade BoT 
lnPCB 0.702* 1                   
lnDC 0.715* 0.976* 1                  
SH1950 (d=1%) 0.240* 0.272* 0.240* 1                 
SH1950 (d=0%) 0.210* 0.234* 0.206* 0.989* 1                
SH1950 (d=2%) 0.259* 0.298* 0.264* 0.993* 0.964* 1               
SH1950 (d=5%) 0.285* 0.334* 0.295* 0.934* 0.874* 0.970* 1              
SH1950adj 0.406* 0.399* 0.390* 0.874* 0.878* 0.856* 0.784* 1             
SH1500 0.229* 0.250* 0.225* 0.990* 0.992* 0.970* 0.884* 0.874* 1            
SH1500adj 0.400* 0.377* 0.376* 0.823* 0.843* 0.790* 0.686* 0.983* 0.847* 1           
AgrY 0.275* 0.272* 0.240* 0.813* 0.816* 0.797* 0.734* 0.715* 0.808* 0.677* 1          
AgrYadj 0.482* 0.418* 0.410* 0.611* 0.630* 0.585* 0.509* 0.804* 0.620* 0.811* 0.801* 1         
lnGFCF 0.488* 0.450* 0.458* 0.258* 0.235* 0.271* 0.281* 0.316* 0.251* 0.305* 0.218* 0.297* 1        
lag(lnHC) 0.840* 0.649* 0.672* 0.125* 0.094* 0.148* 0.183* 0.273* 0.114* 0.269* 0.182* 0.386* 0.344* 1       
lnINFL -0.125* -0.264* -0.197* -0.048 -0.042 -0.052 -0.053 -0.014 -0.051 -0.014 -0.031 0.003 -0.187* -0.089 1      
lnGovCons 0.385* 0.348* 0.342* 0.080 0.079 0.079 0.074 0.038 0.088 0.042 0.152* 0.102* 0.234* 0.323* -0.113* 1     
Violence -0.233* -0.196* -0.180* 0.203* 0.218* 0.185* 0.138* 0.136* 0.208* 0.130* 0.176* 0.082 -0.131* -0.187* 0.116* -0.217* 1    
Polity2 0.510* 0.465* 0.473* -0.016 -0.047 0.009 0.057 0.099* -0.036 0.086 -0.006 0.187* 0.148* 0.655* -0.043 0.190* -0.113* 1   
lnTrade 0.279* 0.304* 0.262* -0.131* -0.134* -0.127* -0.122* -0.098* -0.112* -0.070 -0.076 -0.023 0.289* 0.253* -0.218* 0.291* -0.299* 0.120* 1  
BoT 0.504* 0.179* 0.187* 0.022 -0.013 0.051 0.104* 0.101* 0.007 0.090 0.030 0.117* 0.076 0.376* -0.037 -0.015 -0.063 0.127* 0.088 1 
Banking crisis -0.008 0.021 0.022 -0.067 -0.075 -0.058 -0.033 -0.068 -0.079 -0.080 -0.019 -0.037 -0.125* 0.033 0.234* 0.018 0.040 0.013 -0.064 0.036 
Notes: Pairwise correlations. The asterisk denotes significance at the 1-percent level. 
 
Table A4. Summary statistics of the baseline sample: 95 countries (see Table A1.) & 1970-2014 (5-year periods)  
 








SH1950adj SH1500 SH1500adj AgrY AgrYadj lnGFCF lag(lnHC) lnINFL lnGovCons Violence Polity2 lnTrade BoT Banking 
crisis 
Obs 852 819 819 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 800 842 813 816 849 849 824 824 739 
Mean 8.859 3.255 3.355 0.227 0.174 0.280 0.405 0.276 0.168 0.224 4457 5216 3.027 0.658 4.752 2.651 3.79 2.58 4.047 -3.2 0.39 
Std.Dev. 1.214 0.934 0.942 0.181 0.160 0.201 0.233 0.155 0.190 0.165 2381 2055 0.331 0.349 0.347 0.355 8.32 7.07 0.560 9.6 0.97 
Min 5.841 -0.709 -0.468 0.007 0.005 0.011 0.024 0.022 0.000 0.000 362 1400 1.376 0.007 4.575 1.406 0 -10 1.916 -48.9 0 
Max 11.456 5.505 5.509 0.739 0.746 0.729 0.860 0.727 0.760 0.747 10500 10375 4.187 1.305 8.783 3.704 65 10 6.018 47.4 5 
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Table A5. Sensitivity to the GMM settings (FD = domestic credit) 
Sens. check S1B S2B S3B S4B 
Weighting matrix default default default cross-country & -time 
heteroskedasticity 
Internal IV default default 1st order lags default 
External IV legal origin none default defaut 
Control variables: lag(lny), ln(GFCF), lag(ln(HC)), ln(INFL), ln(GovCons), Violence, Polity2 
ln(DC_bottom) 0.0864 0.1272 0.1421 0.0542  
(0.019) (0.002) (0.001) (0.121) 
ln(DC_upper) -0.0805 -0.0548 -0.0346 -0.0934  
(0.024) (0.163) (0.406) (0.004) 
Wald test (pv) 0.087 0.163 0.040 0.067 
γ 0.216 0.108 0.204 0.216 
SH quartile Q3 Q2 Q3 Q3 
N 544 544 614 544 
no. of countries 95 95 95 95 
Jstat (pv) 0.054 0.030 0.644 0.003 
no. of IVs 26 23 25 32 
Notes: Robust p-values are in brackets. For further notes, see Table 1A. 
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Table A6. Sensitivity to the sample (FD = domestic credit) 
Sens. check S5B S6B S7B S8B S9B S10B S11B S12B S13B S14B S15B 
Complete obs. (min.) 6 3 default default default default default default default default default 
Period default default 1970-2004 1980-2009 default default default default default default default 
Countries default default default default Developed Developing w/o LAC w/o Asia w/o MENA w/o SSA w/o West 
Control variables: lag(lny), ln(GFCF), lag(ln(HC)), ln(INFL), ln(GovCons), Violence, Polity2 
ln(DC_bottom) 0.0752 0.0553 0.0693 0.0569 0.0158 0.0511 0.0278 0.0749 0.0632 0.0163 -0.1663  
(0.011) (0.055) (0.026) (0.099) (0.497) (0.157) (0.313) (0.004) (0.027) (0.558) (0.003) 
ln(DC_upper) -0.0690 -0.0898 -0.0795 -0.1035 -0.0579 -0.0386 -0.1009 -0.0987 -0.1134 -0.0734 0.0378  
(0.04) (0.004) (0.019) (0.001) (0.008) (0.384) (0) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.231) 
Wald test (pv) 0.127 0.063 0.060 0.055 0.235 0.045 0.015 0.050 0.080 0.040 0.000 
γ 0.216 0.216 0.204 0.216 0.104 0.216 0.388 0.228 0.216 0.228 0.039 
SH quartile Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q2 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q2 Q1 
N 512 570 448 471 336 208 407 462 488 413 424 
no. of countries 81 118 87 95 54 41 75 82 85 67 74 
Jstat (pv) 0.077 0.085 0.051 0.049 0.092 0.404 0.082 0.198 0.117 0.009 0.219 
no. of IVs 32 32 31 30 32 28 31 31 31 31 30 
Notes: Robust p-values are in brackets. Developed countries: high income & upper-middle income countries, Developing countries: low income & lower-middle income countries. For 
further notes, see Table 1A. 
Notations: LAC – Latin America & the Caribbean, MENA – Middle East & North Africa, SSA – Sub-Saharan Africa, West – Europe & North America 
 
 
Table A7. Sensitivity to the threshold effect (FD = domestic credit) 
Sens. check S16B S17B S18B S19B S20B S21B 
X with.threshold effect lag(lny) lnGFCF lag(lnHC) ln(INFL) ln(GovCons) Polity2 
Control variables: lag(lny), ln(GFCF), lag(ln(HC)), ln(INFL), ln(GovCons), Violence, Polity2 
ln(DC_bottom) 0.0338 0.0414 0.0533 0.0658 0.0543 0.0611  
(0.221) (0.132) (0.021) (0.012) (0.084) (0.032) 
ln(DC_upper) -0.0540 -0.0843 -0.0693 -0.0782 -0.0279 -0.0634  
(0.127) (0.025) (0.059) (0.021) (0.363) (0.05) 
ln(X_bottom) 0.9046 0.0098 0.2982 -0.0628 0.2303 0.0075 
 (0) (0.875) (0.023) (0.004) (0) (0.002) 
ln(X_upper) 0.8188 0.3068 0.2525 -0.1318 -0.1640 0.0055 
 (0) (0.002) (0.043) (0.005) (0.028) (0.087) 
γ 0.216 0.216 0.216 0.226 0.216 0.204 
SH quartile Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 
Jstat (pv) 0.044 0.035 0.064 0.069 0.099 0.062 
Notes: Robust p-values are in brackets. In each case, N= 544, no. of countries = 95, no. of IVs = 32. For further notes, see Table 1A. 
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Table A8. Sensitivity to the control variables (FD = domestic credit) 
Sens. scenario S22B S23B S24B S25B 
Add. control lnTrade BoT Banking crisis lnPCB*Polity2 
Control variables: lag(lny), ln(GFCF), lag(ln(HC)), ln(INFL), ln(GovCons), Violence, Polity2 
Add. control -0.0814 0.0010 -0.0262 -0.0043 
 (0.116) (0.722) (-0.004) (0.017) 
ln(DC_bottom) 0.0680 0.0674 0.0341 0.0732  
(0.024) (0.035) (0.013) (0.012) 
ln(DC_upper) -0.0808 -0.0938 -0.0546 -0.1162  
(0.014) (0.003) (0.073) (0) 
Wald test (pv) 0.000 0.080 0.010 0.000 
γ 0.216 0.216 0.202 0.228 
SH quartile Q3 Q3 Q3 Q3 
N 544 544 439 544 
no. of countries 95 95 85 95 
Jstat (pv) 0.153 0.091 0.146 0.089 
no. of IVs 34 34 32 34 
Notes: Robust p-values are in brackets. For further notes, see Table 1A.  
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